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Intervention under International Law 
 
M.N.S. SELLERS † 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The lawfulness or legitimacy of "external" intervention in the 
"internal" affairs of sovereign states is one of the most basic 
controversies in modern international law. The question arises in 
three separate but related forms: When is intervention lawful? When 
is intervention legitimate? And when should intervention occur? 
Discussion here will focus on the legal question, but legitimacy, 
morality, and brutal reality all form and sometimes trump the law. 
They dictate the parameters within which all legal determinations 
take place, including the legality of cross-border interventions. By 
“intervention” I mean any activity by one state or its agents that 
influences the actions or attitudes of another state, but particularly the 
threat or use of force, because force is particularly intrusive, 
particularly persuasive, and often particularly resented by those 
subjected to its power. 
Since its earliest elaboration by Hugo Grotius1 and Emer de 
Vattel2 international law has rested on a simple analogy and two 
basic premises: just as every human being should be free and equal 
and independent in all those things that concern her or his private 
interests, so too each state should be free and equal and independent 
in all those things that concern that state's domestic or "sovereign" 
affairs.3 As reaffirmed by the United Nations Charter, this requires 
both that all nations promote "respect for human rights and 
 
† Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland and Director of the 
University of Baltimore Center for International and Comparative Law. 
1. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625) (providing 
one of the earliest theories of international law). 
2. See generally EMER DE VATTEL, DROIT DES GENS (1758) (further 
developing the foundations of early international law). 
3. Cf. U.N. Charter pmbl. (declaring that the United Nations seeks to "reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights . . . [and] in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small”). 
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fundamental freedoms for all"4 and that outsiders not interfere in 
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state."5 More specifically, there should be no threat or use of force 
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state."6 This raises the questions: what rights are “fundamental"?; 
which actions violate a state's "independence"?; and above all, what 
constitutes the "domestic" or “internal” province of states? 
I.      THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES 
If, as Vattel, Grotius, and the Charter of the United Nations 
suppose, states (like individuals) should be free and independent and 
enjoy some zone of autonomy that others must respect, it follows that 
they have an autonomous legal domain of "domestic jurisdiction" 
over their own “internal affairs.” The domestic jurisdiction of states 
includes those areas that international law does not reach and that in 
some circumstances international law should actively protect against 
the improper interventions of others. Domestic jurisdiction begins 
where international jurisdiction ends and embraces those areas not 
appropriate for international control. The difficulty of regulating 
“intervention” arises in drawing this jurisdictional line. Some issues 
do or should belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of states. Some 
issues are or ought to be subject to the overlapping or complementary 
jurisdiction of both domestic and international law. Some issues are 
or should be solely the province of the international rule of law. 
Drawing the jurisdictional lines between different levels of 
governance is a ubiquitous problem, already well-rehearsed in the 
jurisprudence of American federalism or the relationship between the 
laws of the European Union and the laws of its disparate members. 
Judges and others must discern which issues are properly 
cosmopolitan, and which issues are more properly parochial.7 The 
United Nations Charter is far from being the only or decisive 
determinant of international law, but it does embody some broadly 
accepted principles about the parameters of international concern, 
beginning with the importance of fundamental human rights, and the 
 
4. Id. art. 1, para. 3.   
5. Id. art. 2, para. 7. 
6. Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
7. See PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 2012) (discussing the boundaries 
between international law, national jurisdiction, and the private autonomy of 
individuals).  
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dignity and worth of the human person.8 There are also foundational 
international commitments to "justice", to "freedom", and to the 
"economic and social advancement of all peoples", so that "armed 
force shall not be used except in the common interest."9 
These very broad international interests raise the question 
whether anything remains that is the essentially “internal” or 
“domestic” affair of states, sufficiently to exclude the international 
community, or the strictures of international law, from interceding to 
regulate events. This category of the purely internal or domestic 
jurisdiction is rapidly shrinking. Just as in the United States, it has 
become clearer with the passage of time that commerce, the 
environment, manufacturing, farming, and even crime need 
regulation from the federal government to achieve a just and 
beneficial rule of law in the States, so too increases in communication 
and technology push more and more areas of law into the jurisdiction 
of international institutions and international authorities. Whether by 
treaty, by custom, or by the simple nature of the world, much that 
once seemed domestic has become international, or must be 
international, if it is to be regulated at all.10 
II.    FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
Fundamental human rights and the inherent dignity of real 
human beings provide the template and model for the sovereign 
rights and self-determination of states, reflecting the extent to which 
human rights have always been, a central concern of international 
law.11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and later 
the human rights covenants have been extremely useful in clarifying 
those fundamental human rights in which the international 
community has the most direct interest.12 This interest turns out to 
extend very broadly, reaching almost everything that is necessary for 
human dignity and happiness. Each step in the greater articulation of 
international human rights has narrowed the scope of domestic 
jurisdiction, by clarifying the duties of states to their subjects, and the 
concern of international law for the dignity of humanity everywhere. 
 
8. U.N. Charter pmbl.  
9. Id. 
10. For example, the internationalization of commerce (the W.T.O.), 
environmental regulation (the U.N.F.C.C.C.), and the protection of peace and 
security (the United Nations Security Council). 
11. E.g.., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)13 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)14 both illustrate the vast jurisdiction of 
contemporary international law, and a possible limitation on its 
application to particular cases. Both covenants start by recognizing 
the inherent dignity and the “equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, 
justice, and peace in the world” and both demonstrate the very strong 
interest of the international community in protecting fundamental 
human rights.15 But they also go on to insist that all peoples have the 
right to self-determination.16 By virtue of that right, they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development.17 Fundamental human rights are 
best enjoyed in a strong and coherent community, and this 
inescapable reality provides the point of contact between sovereignty 
and liberty, linking collective identity with individual justice. 
III.   INDEPENDENCE 
There is an inherent and fundamental value in the freedom and 
independence of states and their peoples just as there is an inherent 
and fundamental value in the freedom and independence of 
individual human beings. States deserve freedom and independence 
precisely because they are made up of real human beings who value 
community and share culture, customs, and local circumstances. 
These local circumstances may vary considerably from place to 
place. Geographical particularities, as well as historical and cultural 
traditions, can be dramatically different in different parts of the world 
 
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
14. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, pmbl.; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 14, 
pmbl. 
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, art. 1, 
¶ 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 
14, art. 1, ¶ 1. 
17. Id.  
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and among different peoples.  This requires and justifies significant 
variations in local law and customs.18 
Justified differences in local law and customs suggest the benefit 
of “subsidiarity” – the principle that jurisdiction and decision-making 
powers should devolve as much as possible to local authorities, 
provided that local authorities respect the overarching standards of 
general international law. This means that in most areas of law, 
jurisdiction is not very often purely domestic or international, but 
rather overlapping. International law deputizes states (for the most 
part) to enforce and implement universal human rights and other 
international norms internally. But when states fail or refuse to 
implement these rights, or even themselves violate basic standards, 
their obligations to the international community persist.  States that 
violate the universal human rights of their subjects are also violating 
fundamental principles of international law. 
Human rights violations committed by the governments of states 
or their agents present the starkest example of possible conflict 
between the right to independence and fundamental human rights, the 
two foundational principles of modern international law.19  All 
violations of fundamental human rights are also violations of 
international law, but enforcing them or any other international law 
constrains the independence of states.  States owe their duty to 
respect universal human rights not only to those individuals whose 
rights should not be violated, but also to the international community 
as a whole, and to every other state and people.20  Human rights are 
erga omnes, in that they concern everyone, and everyone has the 
right to take countermeasures. But any response to such violations 
must respect the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned,21 and be 
proportionate to the offenses that have been committed.22 
 
18. See PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7. 
19. See MORTIMER N.S. SELLERS, REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF A JUST WORLD ORDER (2006) 
(discussing independence and universal human rights as some of the essential 
principles of a republican system of international law). 
20. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME ET LE PRINCIPE DE NON-INTERVENTION DANS LES AFFAIRES INTÉRIEURES 
DES ETATS [THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATE] (1989) available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1989_comp_03_en.PDF. 
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
22. See SELLERS, supra note 19, ch. 21. 
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IV.   INTERVENTION 
“Intervention” is a term of art in international law.  Everything 
that anyone ever does is an intervention in the strictest sense of the 
term, to the extent that it has an effect or an influence on someone 
else.  We all have and should have very broad rights of intervention, 
in this ordinary sense, over almost everything we encounter, because 
we do and should enjoy a great freedom of action.  Intervention is a 
continuum, ranging from criticism to coercion.  The legality, 
legitimacy and practical value of an intervention will vary according 
to two variables: the intrusiveness of the intervention contemplated 
and locus of jurisdiction over its target.  Intended interventions may 
be barred either because the effects of intervention would be too 
severe or because the subject matter of the planned intervention is no 
business of those who want to intervene. 
My primary concern here will be with intervention by force, both 
because it is the most intrusive form of intervention and because the 
United Nations charter so explicitly forbids the use of force “against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”23  
Lesser interventions may also be problematic,24 but do not so starkly 
present the underlying conflict between independence and justice.  
The United Nations is barred from intervening in matters that are 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”25 and it 
may be assumed that a similar prohibition also applies to 
interventions by the states themselves.26  Interventions by force must 
meet a very high standard, and face a near absolute prohibition when 
they violate the “territorial integrity”, the “political independence” or 
the “domestic jurisdiction” of any state. 
This is not to say that intervention by force is never warranted.  
The Charter of the United Nations contemplates the use of force at 
the direction of the Security Council (Art. 42), in self-defense (Art. 
51), through regional arrangements (Art. 52), and in other ways that 
are not incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations or the 
territorial integrity and political independence of states.27  Thus the 
 
23. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
24. See SELLERS, supra note 19, ch. 21. 
25. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
26. See e.g., VATTEL, supra note 2, at 37–38 (discussing the injury done to 
states by external intervention in their “affaires domestiques.”). 
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7. 
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limits of legal intervention by force, like the concept of “domestic 
jurisdiction”, ultimately depend on the principles and purposes that 
justify the international order itself, including fundamental human 
rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, the equal rights of 
men and women, and the equal rights of nations, large and small.28 
V.     LEGALLY JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 
 The clearest example of a legally justified intervention by force 
under the traditional ius gentium was intervention to remove and 
punish a tyrannical ruler, who oppressed the people subject to his 
rule.  Jean Bodin, the apostle of sovereignty, admitted already in the 
sixteenth century that “it is a most beautiful and magnificent thing for 
a prince to take up arms in order to avenge an entire people unjustly 
oppressed by a tyrant’s cruelty.”29 Vattel explained more prosaically 
that rulers lose the right to rule when they violate the purposes that 
justify their authority.30  
 This raises the question whether interventions to prevent 
oppression, to defend fundamental human rights, to protect the 
dignity and worth of the human person, or to secure the equal rights 
of men and women, or of nations large and small (to echo the words 
of the Charter) are in fact or ever can be restricted by international 
law.  States parties to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide undertook to “prevent and to 
punish” the crime of genocide31 and there have been a number of 
recent military interventions both under the authority of the United 
Nations Security Council, as in Libya in 2011,32 or without Security 
Council approval, as in Kosovo in 199933 that have been justified by 
those who intervened as being necessary to prevent  “humanitarian 
catastrophe.”34 
 
28. Id., pmbl. 
29. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 113 (Julian H. Franklin ed., 1992) 
(translating JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (1586)). 
30. VATTEL, supra note 2, at 22 (“. . . puisqu’elle n’auroit plus aucun droit elle-
même, si elle vouloit opprimer une partie des Citoyens.”). 
31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
32. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (demanding an 
“immediate ceasefire,” establishing a no-fly zone, and authorizing states to “take all 
necessary measures” to protect civilians). 
33. See Press Statement, Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the N. Atl. 
Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO (Mar. 23, 1999) (noting “no alternative [was] open 
but to take military action”). 
34. Id. 
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 The problem to be confronted in evaluating armed intervention 
against genocide, or to prevent crimes against humanity, or otherwise 
to enforce international humanitarian law, arises less from 
determining the legality of such interventions in principle than in 
applying the law and its principles to specific cases.  Even the worst 
violators of human rights standards and fundamental freedoms in 
their own internal affairs, such as the Putin regime in Russia, cite 
international human rights standards and the principles of 
humanitarian intervention to justify their invasions and interference 
in the internal affairs of other nations.35  Those culpable for the recent 
Russian interventions in and occupations of the internal territories of 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine all purport to respect the 
requirements and humanitarian principles of international law, while 
violating them in practice.  Thus even the most oppressive states 
concede the principle that tyranny justifies intervention, to justify 
their own oppressive and illegal invasions. 
VI.   BAD FAITH 
 The Russian example illustrates the problem of bad faith in 
international law.  Grotius followed Cicero in identifying good faith 
(“bona fides”) as the ultimate basis of international justice.36 For 
although law and justice may at times be somewhat obscure, good 
faith clarifies the result, by referring to the purpose of the 
enterprise.37 When the law is clear, as in the prohibition of 
aggression, malefactors will invent their own spurious facts, to justify 
their crimes.38  In the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms, 
this opens the interpretation and application of international law to 
significant abuse.  Aggressors will present their attacks as legitimate 
intervention, and criminals will decry their just punishments as 
unwarranted interference.  The Putin regime has done both. 
 
35. See e.g. Transcript: Putin defends Russian intervention in Ukraine, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-
defends-russian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-
55f0c77bf39c_story.html (vigorously defending Russia’s intervention in Ukraine). 
36. See GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 608 (“Fide enim non tantum respublica 
quaelibet continetur, ut Cicero dicit, sed et maior illa gentium societas.”). 
37. See id. at 609 (“Et iustitia quidem in caeteris sui partibus saepe habet 
aliquid obscuri: at fidei vinculum per se manifestum est . . . .”). 
38. Vladimir Putin, Address Concerning the Annexation of Crimea (Mar. 18, 
2014) available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. 
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 Even states seeking to act in good faith will make mistakes when 
they act as judges in their own cases.  The endorsement of the 
Security Council, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the 
European Union, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, or some other multi-state deliberative forum with significant 
participation from liberal constitutional democracies will give even 
well-intentioned and generally law-abiding states greater assurance of 
legality in their international interventions than they would or should 
have, when acting on their own.  Multilateral interventions, pursued 
with the approval of international deliberative bodies, will be more 
likely to be accurate in their assessment of the law and facts than 
deliberation wholly among the officials of any single nation.  This 
points to the great importance of deliberative procedure in 
determining the substance of any international legal requirement.  
Good faith requires a certain humility in considering the opinions of 
others. 
 The requirement of good faith in applying the laws governing 
international intervention to the facts of particular cases reflects a 
fundamental distinction dividing the Grotian discipline of 
international law from the Hobbesian field of international relations.  
International law rests on universal principles, human dignity, and the 
value of humanity as a whole.  The field of international relations 
studies power and personal advantage.  International law, like all law, 
claims to seek and implement justice and promote the common good 
of all those subject to its rule.  Whether or not this can ever be or 
become entirely true, justice and the common good put significant 
constraints on development of law in practice.  Purported laws that 
depart too far from widely shared perceptions of justice and the 
common good will lose their ability to influence human behavior.  
This is particularly true of international law, for which strong 
enforcement mechanisms do not yet exist, beyond the public opinion 
of states and their citizens. 
VII. LEGITIMACY 
 Some international lawyers have asserted (for example) that the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo was “illegal,” but nevertheless 
“legitimate.”39  Whether or not this was true in fact, the claim serves 
 
39. See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (“But in the end, the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo found that although formally illegal -- the United Nations 
Charter demands that the use of force in any cause other than self-defense be 
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to remind us that on vital questions such as international 
interventions, arguments from legality are not the final word.  All law 
claims to realize justice, but if law fails to do so in practice, other 
institutions will assert themselves.  The concept of  “legitimacy” in 
any given context signifies having met the standard required for the 
practice in question.  The standard for international law is justice.  
International law that fails to advance international justice, loses its 
claim on our fidelity, on our obedience, and even on our interest in 
what the law may or may not require, according to its own terms. 
 Law arises from the collective effort to embody legitimacy in 
determinate rules and institutions.  The only difference between legal 
and other supposedly legitimate action is that law is mediated by 
procedures that make legality more concrete.  But in the case of 
international law, these procedures are radically incomplete.  
Lawyers and judges must find international legal rules in 
international conventions, in international custom, in the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, in judicial 
decisions, and in the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists.40  None of these have sufficient institutional authority 
entirely to supersede the direct appeal to external standards of justice. 
Such authorities as “custom” and “teachings” of the publicists 
constitute “evidence” of the law rather its source, which ultimately 
arises in “those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant 
to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent 
nations.”41 
 Powerful states respect and obey international law (when they do 
so) primarily because they believe international law to be legitimate, 
according to the universal standard of legitimacy for law, which is 
that law should achieve or approximate justice more effectively than 
would be possible in the absence of law, or by direct appeals to 
justice.  States acting in good faith, when they contemplate 
intervention, will look first to the law, and to the general principles of 
law accepted by civilized nations. They will deliberate if possible, in 
the context of multinational institutions, and decide, when they can, 
in consultation with other nations that respect the international rule of 
 
authorized by the Security Council -- the intervention was nonetheless legitimate in 
the eyes of the international community.”). 
40. E.g. U.N. Charter arts. 33–38 (creating the International Court of Justice). 
41. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (R.H. Dana, Jr. 
ed., 8th ed. 1866). 
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law.  Legitimacy in the light of justice is the ultimate measure of 
international law, and therefore of international intervention, and 
unilateral intervention, without the approval of other nations, is 
unlikely to be either lawful or legitimate, because it has not survived 
the burden of persuasion, which is the best measure of validity in 
international law. 
CONCLUSION 
 External interventions to prevent or punish “internal” violations 
of international law will continue to occur for the same reasons that 
people have always acted against injustice.  These include sympathy 
for the victims, fear of the perpetrators, and the general desire to 
establish just legal principles by enforcing them against violators.  
Nations deserve a zone of sovereignty or “domestic jurisdiction” 
within which to develop their own histories and cultures, but 
governments never have the license to oppress or exploit the peoples 
subject to their care.  The sovereign rights of states derive from the 
human rights of individuals.  Governments that oppress their subjects 
are violating international law, and should expect to face 
consequences if their violations persist. 
 External interventions can be legal under international law and 
legitimate sub specie aeternitatis whenever serious humanitarian 
catastrophes require them and so long as the states enforcing 
international law respect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the peoples they protect.  All nations and their 
peoples have the right to self-determination, so that the citizens 
themselves may decide who their rulers shall be.  Just as foreign 
powers have no right to interfere in a state’s internal affairs, so too 
local governments that deny their subjects’ human rights and 
fundamental freedoms forfeit their right to rule.  The limits of 
external intervention depend on the value of human dignity, the 
welfare of those oppressed, the good faith of the enforcers, and their 
humility in the face of public deliberation.  Sometimes the use of 
force will be justified to put an end to serious and systematic attacks 
on human dignity, but this cannot become the pretext for imperial 
aggression.  
Without justice, there will be no peace.42 
 
 
42. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, pmbl. 
